Traditional Tests for Implication of Terms Prevail in Singapore Despite ‘Acceptance’ of Belize Test: Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd by GOH, Yihan
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
6-2012
Traditional Tests for Implication of Terms Prevail in
Singapore Despite ‘Acceptance’ of Belize Test:
Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd
Yihan GOH
Singapore Management University, yihangoh@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Law Commons
This Blog Post is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
GOH, Yihan. Traditional Tests for Implication of Terms Prevail in Singapore Despite ‘Acceptance’ of Belize Test: Sembcorp Marine
Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd. (2012). Singapore Law Watch Commentaries. 2012, 1-6. Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/1508
1 
 
 
 
       
Issue 1/Jun 2012 
 
 
 
Traditional tests for implication of terms prevail in Singapore 
despite ‘acceptance’ of Belize test 
 
Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd [2012] SGHC 118 
 
 
GOH YIHAN∗ 
 
Introduction 
There is an ongoing legal debate concerning the test governing the implication of terms in 
fact, prompted in no small measure by Lord Hoffmann’s influential speech in Attorney 
General of Belize v Belize Telecom.1 In Belize, Lord Hoffmann famously said that the 
question for a court considering whether a term should be implied is ‘whether such a [term] 
would spell out in express words what the instrument, read against the relevant background, 
would reasonably be understood to mean’.2 This has generally been regarded by judges3 and 
academics4 as subsuming the implication of terms within the broader rubric of 
‘interpretation’. The consequence is that the ‘reasonable person’ test that underpins 
contractual interpretation now applies to determine whether a term should be implied.  
In Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd,5 the Singapore High Court purported to 
accept Lord Hoffmann’s approach in relation to the implication of terms as stated in Belize, 
but, it is respectfully submitted, ended up affirming the traditional approach towards 
implication and recognising nothing new. This may well have been consciously intended by 
the court and flowed primarily from a narrow reading of Belize, which recast Lord 
Hoffmann’s test of interpretation as a threshold step before that of implication, rather than 
as an overarching test that subsumes implication. The approach in Sembcorp really stands 
for three points, each of which will be dealt with in this brief note. First, it recognised that 
                                                          
∗ Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. http://law.nus.edu.sg/about_us 
/faculty/staff/profileview.asp?UserID=lawgohy. 
1 [2009] 1 WLR 1988 (‘Belize’). 
2 [2009] 1 WLR 1988 at [21]. 
3 See, eg, Spencer v Secretary of State of Defence [2012] EWHC 120 (Ch) at [71]; Stena Line v Merchant Navy 
Ratings Pension Fund Trustees Limited [2011] EWCA Civ 543 at [36]–[41]; Thomas Crema v. Cenkos Securities 
plc [2010] EWCA Civ 1444 at [38]–[39]. 
4 See, eg, Sir Kim Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011 at 281–285; Gerard 
McMeel, The Construction of Contracts: Interpretation, Implication, and Rectification, 2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press, 2011 at 344 –345; Paul S Davies, ‘Recent developments in the law of implied terms’ [2010] 
LMCLQ 140; Elizabeth Macdonald, ‘Casting Aside “Officious Bystanders” and “Business Efficacy”’ (2009) 26 JCL 
97 at 99–100. 
5 [2012] SGHC 118 (‘Sembcorp’). 
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implication is a distinct step from interpretation; more specifically, implication is not a 
subset of interpretation. Second, it acknowledged that the traditional tests of ‘business 
efficacy’ and ‘officious bystander’ still govern implication in fact and provide normative 
guidance in the process. Third, it postulated that the parties’ subjective intentions could be 
admitted in the implication process, especially if they were ‘objectively ascertained’.6 
Implication as distinct from interpretation 
Turning to the first point outlined above, the court in Sembcorp appears to have read Belize 
narrowly so as to preserve the traditional distinction between implication and interpretation. 
For example, it stated that the Belize approach was not ‘an overhaul of the process of 
implication of terms’ and that ‘[t]he process of implication is closer to the process of 
interpretation that might have been explicitly stated before Belize’.7 Moreover, the court said 
that ‘[w]hen implying terms into a contract, the court must necessarily interpret the contract 
to ascertain the parties’ presumed common intention before the court can determine what 
term to imply … to give effect to such intention’.8 Finally, and most expressly, the court said 
no less than three times that implication and interpretation were ‘separate’ and ‘distinct’.9 
While these statements would not be out of place in a judgment criticising Belize, the court in 
Sembcorp was actually very much in agreement with that case. In particular, the court noted 
that ‘[t]he value of Belize lies in its clear elucidation of the relationship between 
interpretation and implication’ and that it has ‘made explicit a process which must have been 
impliedly carried out in all previous instances where terms were implied in fact’.10 It is 
respectfully submitted that the court’s approval of Belize flowed from too narrow a reading of 
Belize. Although English cases decided after Belize do not speak with one voice, the vast 
majority have considered the process of implication as being subsumed within that of 
interpretation following Belize. A few examples would serve to illustrate this point: 
• In Procter & Gamble & ors v Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget, Hildyard J said 
that Lord Hoffmann in Belize clarified and emphasised ‘that the implication of a term 
is an exercise in the construction of the instrument of the instrument as a whole’.11 
• In Spencer v Secretary of State of Defence, Vos J said that ‘Belize made clear that 
the process of interpretation and of implication of terms are part of the same unified 
process of establishing the objective meaning of the contract. The implication of a 
term “only spells out what the instrument means”. It is, as with the process of 
construction, what it means to the reasonable observer, not to the parties.’12 
• In Stena Line v Merchant Navy Ratings Pension Fund Trustees Limited, Arden 
LJ said that Lord Hoffmann emphasised that ‘it must not be forgotten that the real 
task is always one of interpretation. The effect of the implication must be to make the 
instrument mean what it would reasonably be understood to mean. The danger of 
using formulae, such as “necessary to give the contract business efficacy”, is that such 
phrases can take on a “life of their own” and divert focus from the task of 
interpretation.’13 
                                                          
6 [2012] SGHC 118 at [58]. 
7 [2012] SGHC 118 at [49]. 
8 [2012] SGHC 118 at [51]. 
9 [2012] SGHC 118 at [55]–[56]. 
10 [2012] SGHC 118 at [60]. 
11 [2012] EWHC 498 (Ch) at [8], [81]–[83]. 
12 [2012] EWHC 120 (Ch) at [71]. 
13 [2011] EWCA Civ 543 at [36]–[41]. 
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• In Thomas Crema v Cenkos Securities plc, Aikens LJ said that the Belize 
approach is such that ‘if the “reasonable addressee” would understand the 
instrument, against the other terms and the relevant background, to mean something 
more, ie that something is to happen in that particular event which is not expressly 
dealt with in the instrument’s terms, then it is said that the court implies a term as to 
what will happen if the event in question occurs.’14 
These cases all indicate that Lord Hoffmann’s approach in Belize has only to do with 
interpretation, and interpretation alone. It may therefore be reconsidered if the court’s 
reading of Belize was correct in Sembcorp.  
More specifically, it appears that while the court in Sembcorp accepted the role of 
interpretation, it did not regard it being determinative, in and of itself, to ascertain whether a 
term could be implied. Rather, the court viewed the process of interpretation as a threshold 
step to be satisfied before a term could be implied. As a threshold point, and with respect, the 
court was probably not as accurate as it could be when it said that the court must interpret 
the contract to ascertain the parties’ presumed common intention.15 Interpretation does not 
yield the parties’ presumed intention, but rather, their objectively ascertained actual 
intention. But more to the point, the court’s reference to ‘presumed common intention’ 
further reinforces the point that it saw implication as distinct from interpretation. It is only 
through the process of implication, as distinct from interpretation, that we arrive at the 
parties’ presumed intention. The traditional tests for implication operate as default rules 
(broadly speaking)16 that operate in the absence of a clear indication of intention: thus, it is 
presumed that the parties would want the contract to cater to business efficacy. It is for this 
reason that a term is implied as a matter of business efficacy so as to give effect to the parties’ 
presumed intention (that the contract is to cater to business efficacy). Such a process would 
be absent pursuant to a purely interpretative approach because the court would, pursuant to 
such an approach, be wholly concerned with the parties’ actual intentions, as objectively 
ascertained by the process of interpretation.  
What the court in Sembcorp did was really to acknowledge the very established rule that an 
implied term must not be inconsistent with an express term. Thus, the court’s statement that 
‘the interpretation of the contract is often a preliminary step in the implication of a term’17 
and that ‘Belize demands that the term implied must be checked for consonance with a 
reasonable interpretation of the contract’.18 These statements imply a limited scope for 
interpretation. Rather than being determinative of whether a term can be implied, 
interpretation acts as a negative test: is the term to be implied consistent with the express 
terms as objectively interpreted, failing which, it will not be implied. Indeed, this is 
illustrated by the court’s application of its statement of the law to the facts of Sembcorp:19 
The court has to ascertain whether the particular factual matrix of the case (see Ng 
Giap Hon at [89]) gives rise to circumstances that would make it necessary to imply 
the Second Implied Term into the JVA and the SA, with reference to the business 
efficacy, officious bystander, and Belize requirements. Satisfaction of either20 the 
business efficacy or officious bystander tests would suffice for the implication of the 
term and the Belize statement requires that the term implied be checked for 
consonance with a reasonable interpretation of the JVA and the SA.  
                                                          
14 [2010] EWCA Civ 1444 at [38]–[39]. 
15 [2012] SGHC 118 at [51]. 
16 Cf Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman [2002] 1 AC 408 at 458–459. 
17 [2012] SGHC 118 at [56]. 
18 [2012] SGHC 118 at [60]. 
19 [2012] SGHC 118 at [65]. 
20 With respect, this assumes that the traditional tests are alternatives, contrary to established Court of Appeal 
authority that the two are complementary. 
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The statement that the implied term be ‘checked for consonance with a reasonable 
interpretation’ of the various agreement simply restates the basic principle that the implied 
terms must not be inconsistent with a reasonable interpretation of the express terms of the 
contract. This is not controversial and has been recognised in many local decisions.21 This is 
also consistent with the court’s view in Sembcorp that implication and interpretation are 
wholly distinct doctrines. However, such a limited scope for interpretation in the implication 
of terms may not be what Lord Hoffmann had in mind in Belize.  
Therefore, despite its apparent agreement with Belize, the approach in Sembcorp may 
actually be to disagree with Belize, based on a broader (and, correct, it is submitted) reading 
of that case. In preserving a limited (and distinct) role for interpretation in implication, the 
court in Sembcorp may actually be agreeing with the Court of Appeal’s critique against the 
Belize approach in MFM Restaurants Pte Ltd v Fish & Co Restaurants Pte Ltd22 that that 
approach involved an unnecessarily high level of abstraction engendered by a broad test of 
interpretation.23 Viewed this way, and taking the Court of Appeal’s criticisms of Belize in 
mind, the court’s approach in Sembcorp cannot be regarded as being substantively wrong. If 
there is anything that requires reconsideration, then it is respectfully submitted would be the 
court’s rather narrow reading of Belize. 
Traditional tests still govern implication? 
The second point arising from Sembcorp is that the court considered that ‘the Belize test is 
really the same two traditional tests combined into a minimalist package’.24 The court also 
emphasised elsewhere that Lord Hoffmann in Belize ‘did not purport to supersede or render 
obsolete the traditional tests for the implications terms [in fact]’25 and that he preserved the 
high threshold of ‘necessity’ pursuant to the ‘business efficacy’ test before a term could be 
implied.26 Although it is true that Lord Hoffmann in Belize did expressly say that a court may 
find the traditional tests helpful,27 the fact is that Lord Hoffmann actually undermined the 
strict requirement of ‘necessity’ by referencing the criterion of ‘reasonableness’. As has been 
pointed out,28 the test of ‘interpretation’, which Lord Hoffmann says applies to the entire 
process of implication, broadens the traditional requirement of ‘necessity’ in relation to the 
implication of terms in fact to one of ‘reasonableness’. This is because, according to Investors 
Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society,29 interpretation is the 
‘ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person 
having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the 
parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract’30 [emphasis added]. 
Thus, the restriction which Lord Hoffmann placed on the word ‘necessity’ in the context of 
the ‘business efficacy’ test is no longer whether the implication is necessary to give effect to 
business efficacy, but whether the implication is necessary to convey the meaning as 
understood by a reasonable person. Therefore, the criterion of ‘reasonableness’ has become 
the governing test over that of ‘necessity’.  
While ‘reasonableness’ itself is not an objectionable criterion, it is the potential uncertainty 
which it engenders that is open to criticism. And, more to the point, this may also undermine 
the court’s belief in Sembcorp that the traditional tests of implication still apply in their 
                                                          
21 See, eg, Ng Giap Hon v Westcomb Securities Pte Ltd [2009] 3 SLR(R) 518. 
22 [2011] 1 SLR 150. 
23 MFM Restaurants Pte Ltd v Fish & Co Restaurants Pte Ltd [2011] 1 SLR 150 (‘MFM Restaurants’) at [98]. 
24 [2012] SGHC 118 at [46] and [59]. 
25 [2012] SGHC 118 at [59]. 
26 [2012] SGHC 118 at [57]. 
27 [2009] 1 WLR 1988 at [21]. 
28 E MacDonald, “Casting Aside ‘Officious Bystanders’ and ‘Business Efficacy’?” (2009) 26 JCL 97 at 99. 
29 [1998] 1 WLR 896. 
30 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 912. 
 
  Issue 1/Jun 2012 
 5 
original form under Lord Hoffmann’s approach in Belize. However, as has been argued 
above, because the court in Sembcorp adopted in effect a narrow reading of Belize, its view 
that the traditional tests still co-exist with the regime of interpretation can be justified. It is, 
rather, its reading of Belize that should be reconsidered. 
Consideration of parties’ subjective intentions? 
Finally, the court in Sembcorp made the point that the parties’ subjective intentions could be 
referred to in the implication of terms. Ignoring the correctness of this statement for the 
moment, this firstly reinforces the point made throughout this note that the court in 
Sembcorp did not, in fact, follow Lord Hoffmann’s approach in Belize by treating implication 
as a facet of interpretation. This is because Lord Hoffmann’s approach does not permit the 
court to consider the parties’ intentions since it involves an objective interpretation of the 
contract by a reasonable person. This has been further emphasised by later English cases. 
For example, in Mediterranean Salvage and Towage limited v Seamar Trading & 
Commerce Inc,31 Lord Clarke MR said that ‘Lord Hoffmann [in Belize] then warned against 
considering the subjective state of mind of the parties … and stressed the need for the court 
to be satisfied that the proposed implication spells out what the contract would reasonably 
be understood to mean”.32 Likewise, in Stena Line v Merchant Navy Ratings Pension Fund 
Trustees Limited,33 Arden LJ said that ‘the process of interpretation is an objective one; the 
court does not ask what the parties intended any more that it asks what it would have been 
reasonable for them to agree. Indeed, the test propounded by Lord Hoffmann is written in 
the passive voice avoiding any suggestion that reasonableness is to be tested by reference to 
the views of a reasonable bystander or of one of the parties to the document’.34  
 Returning then to the correctness of the court’s statement in Sembcorp that the parties’ 
subjective intention could be taken into account in the process of implication if it can be 
objectively ascertained, two points can be made.  
 The first is that the court appears to have wrongly relied on Kim Eng Securities Pte Ltd v 
Goh Teng Poh Karen35 as the authority that the parties’ subjective intention can be relied on 
in implication. In Sembcorp, counsel for the plaintiff argued that Kim Eng stood for the 
application of Belize in Singapore. The court in Sembcorp rightly rejected this argument, 
since the court in Kim Eng had merely cited, without agreement, counsel’s argument that 
Belize applied in Singapore. However, the court in Sembcorp then went on to justify the 
court’s approach in Kim Eng as being determined ‘based on the subjective knowledge and 
actions of the defendant there at various points in time, as would be appropriate in reliance 
on the traditional tests [of implication].’36 However, the court in Kim Eng had relied on the 
defendant’s subjective intention for the implication of a term by trade practice or custom, 
rather than in fact. In fact, as will be seen, subjective intention is used in implication in fact 
to negative an implied term; in Kim Eng, the court had actually found an implied term. 
Thus, Kim Eng does not, with respect, stand for the proposition that the parties’ subjective 
intention can be taken into account pursuant to the traditional tests.  
 The correct case ought to be that of Spring v National Amalgamated Stevedores and 
Docker Society.37 In that case, Sir Leonard Stone VC refused to imply a term when it would 
go against one of the parties’ actual (subjective) intention; such as when the plaintiff would 
                                                          
31 [2009] EWCA Civ 531. 
32 [2009] EWCA Civ 531 at [13]. 
33 [2011] EWCA Civ 543. 
34 [2011] EWCA Civ 543 at [41]. See also Spencer v Secretary of State of Defence [2012] EWHC 120 (Ch) at [57]. 
35 [2011] SGHC 201 (‘Kim Eng’). 
36 [2012] SGHC 118 at [41]. 
37 [1965] 1 WLR 585. 
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reply ‘What’s that?’ instead of ‘Of course not’ to the officious bystander. As has been pointed 
out, this may well be decided differently following the approach taken Belize premised on 
interpretation,38 but the court’s acceptance of the continued relevance of subjective intention 
serves only to underscore, it bears repeating, the preservation of the traditional approach for 
implication of terms in Singapore.  
 The second point that can be made is with reference to the court’s statement in 
Sembcorp that such subjective intention must be ‘objectively ascertained’ in order to be 
relevant.39 This is not controversial but it must be emphasised that the court was using the 
word ‘objective’ not in the sense as contrasted with ‘subjective’, but simply to underscore the 
fact that evidence before the court is to be evaluated independently. The court in Sembcorp 
must not be regarded as saying that the subjective intention must somehow be infused with 
objectivity in a sense that is contradistinguished from subjectivity; indeed, such a reading 
would be inherently contradictory. 
Conclusion 
In summary, then, although the court in Sembcorp purported to agree with Lord Hoffmann’s 
approach in Belize, the reality is that it in fact disagreed with that approach. The 
preservation of the distinction between implication and interpretation, the continued 
recognition that the traditional tests still apply to govern implication in their narrow ways, 
and the holding that the parties’ subjective intention still matters in implication are all 
incompatible with the widely-accepted reading of Belize. Yet, the approach in Sembcorp is 
not substantively wrong; indeed, its acceptance of the pre-Belize approach is actually in line 
with the Court of Appeal’s critique of the Belize approach in MFM Restaurants. Assuming 
that the Court of Appeal’s critique is correct, the actual approach in Sembcorp is not 
substantively wrong. What may warrant a reconsideration is the court’s reading of Belize. In 
the end, it seems that, notwithstanding an apparent acceptance of Belize, the traditional tests 
(and approach) in relation to implication in fact still survive for further application (and 
consideration) in Singapore. 
                                                          
38 Sir Kim Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011 at 300–301. 
39 [2012] SGHC 118 at [58]. 
